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Asylum seekers and
State of first arrival
Lisa Yarwood, the University of Exeter analyses
a House of Lords judgment relevant to New Zealand legislation
I
n May the House of Lords released a unanimous judg-
ment in Secretary of State v Nasseri [2009] UKHL 23
refusing to declare the Secretary of State’s decision to
return the appellant asylum seeker to Greece, as the country
of first arrival, incompatible with obligations under the
European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms. This note reflects on those
aspects of the decision that relate to the right to refuse asylum
to individuals arriving via a third State, rather than from the
country of origin.
The discussion seeks to determine the extent to which
States have a right under international law to refuse entry to
asylum seekers, before contrasting the rule as it is expressed
in the EU context, as was the case in relation to the Nasseri
judgment, and New Zealand. Having established what the
scope of the rule is, this note will examine the rationale that
underlies it. This analysis draws on the discussion in the
Nasseri judgment to consider firstly, whether the right to
return asylum seekers allows States to escape their obliga-
tions in relation to international protection and secondly,
whether any right to send asylum seekers back to the country
of first arrival has the potential to undermine the prohibition
on refoulement that underpins the framework of interna-
tional protection.
RETURNING ASYLUM SEEKERS
States are under no legal obligation to determine an applica-
tion for asylum, unless the failure to do so would undermine
the prohibition on refouling an asylum seeker to their State of
origin, where there is a reasonable risk that the individual
will face persecution. The prohibition is expressed in art 33
of the Geneva Refugee Convention 1951, is a principle of
customary international law and forms the basis of the
framework of international protection that binds all States.
All other rules applying to the protection of asylum seekers
and the rights and duties of States relating to the protection
of asylum seekers are secondary in status.
If the prohibition on refoulement is the foundation on
which the framework of international protection is built then
the principle of burden sharing between States for this pur-
pose can be said to give the framework its stability. In order
that the protection of asylum seekers is effective, States are
required to co-operate. Burden sharing is prescribed under
both formal agreements, such as the Dublin II Regulation
(Council Regulation (EC) No 343/2003) in the EU context,
and informal arrangements, for example in times of mass
exodus and in response to calls by the UN High Commis-
sioner for Refugees (UNHCR) for States to grant asylum
seekers temporary entry.
The right to return asylum seekers to the country of first
arrival illustrates the tension that arises between these two
pillars of international refugee law. On the one hand the right
to return facilitates the procedural and resource burden in
processing asylum applications and the integration of suc-
cessful applicants into society. On the other hand there is the
risk that States will seek to avoid their responsibilities with-
out ensuring that the individual asylum seeker will be safe, if
returned. In order to strike a balance between these poten-
tially competing considerations several guiding principles
have emerged.
First, an individual may only be returned to the country of
first arrival if the State is satisfied that the asylum seeker will
not be refouled to the originating State and that the appli-
cant’s human rights will be protected (UNHCR Executive
Committee Conclusion No 58 (1989)). In particular, the
returning State would have to determine “if the risk of
persecution, refoulement or torture was non-existent; if there
was no actual risk to the person’s life; if a genuinely accessible
and durable solution was in prospect … and if specific
protection needs were recognized and respected” (UNHCR
“Note on International Protection” (1998)).
Second, the State must undertake a practical and holistic
examination of the circumstances relating both to the asylum
seeker and the country of first arrival in order to determine
whether the individual faces any risk if returned (UNHCR
“Global Consultations” (2001)). For example, it is insuffi-
cient simply to rely on the fact that the country of first arrival
has adopted human rights instruments if the State also has a
record of human rights abuses or non-compliance. Any analy-
sis must be pragmatic and the UNHCR has noted that even
the presence of a UNHCR Office within the country is not
enough to ensure effective protection (UNHCR “Submis-
sions on the New Zealand Immigration Bill 2007” para 22).
Furthermore, regard must be had to the conditions that the
asylum seeker can expect to face on return, for example they
must have access to some means of subsistence. Effective
protection would therefore take into account socio-
economic considerations including education and special
assistance needs where required (Lisbon Expert Roundtable
“Summary Conclusions on the Concept of Effective Protec-
tion in the Context of Secondary Movements” (2009)).
Third, the returning State must seek assurance from the
country of first arrival that the asylum seeker would have
access to a fair and impartial process for determination of
asylum status. In particular, the country of first arrival must
be a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention and Additional
1967 Protocol (Goodwin-Gill and McAdam The Refugee in
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International Law (2007)). This last point is especially impor-
tant to pre-empt the asylum seeker being immediately refouled
to the State of origin without any substantive consideration
of their application for asylum.
RATIONALE IN RETURNING ASYLUM SEEKERS
The development of the above guidelines seeks a balance
between ensuring international protection is effective and
sharing the burden of providing international protection
between States. In striking this balance, the guidelines aim to
ensure the right to return is not subject to abuse by States and
that the protection framework is not exploited by individuals
to the detriment of genuine asylum seekers.
In favour of allowing States to return asylum seekers to a
country of first arrival is the argument that if individuals
were truly in need of protection from persecution then it
would be irrelevant which State provides that protection.
This would stop asylum seekers from engaging in forum
shopping in order to obtain the most attractive place of
residence.
However, this fails to take into account that individuals
may seek asylum in a particular country for valid reasons
including family unity. It also fails to acknowledge that an
individual may have a valid reason for not wishing to stay in
the country of first arrival, such as a risk of persecution when
the individual is in a minority (Goodwin-Gill, pp 392–393).
At a practical level, if there was a strict requirement that only
the country of first arrival could handle an asylum claim then
certain countries would be required to shoulder a dispropor-
tionate burden given their geographic proximity to regions
that generate large numbers of asylum claims. Notably, New
Zealand’s isolation means that a majority of asylum seekers
will transit in a third State before arrival.
In contrast, the argument in favour of construing the right
to return strictly is that without restriction, States could
implement a returns policy in a manner that undermines the
objective of burden sharing and maintenance of an effective
international protection framework. On this basis, the ratio-
nale for a right to return is arguably stronger in areas of
regional cooperation and less convincing where the State is
not proportionally placed under a significant weight in terms
of providing international protection,which arguably includes
New Zealand.
By illustration, data from the UNHCR shows that in New
Zealand in 2007 there were 2740 individuals seeking asy-
lum. This is compared to 22,164 asylum seekers in Australia;
299,718 in the UK; 281,291 in the USA and 1,585,546 in
Europe (Statistical Data (2007)). Reference to these statistics
does not begin to illustrate the nuances associated with their
interpretation but it does provide a snapshot of the extent of
the burden of international protection being borne by some
States as opposed to others. A second statistic is a compari-
son between the inflows of asylum seekers in a given year
into OECD countries. New Zealand had 23 asylum seekers
in one year while Luxembourg, which is of a similar size, had
129. This can be explained on the basis of geographic loca-
tion.
It is apparent that the right to return is a mechanism that
seeks to facilitate rather than frustrate international protec-
tion for asylum seekers but that without careful monitoring
there is the potential for abuse. With that comment in mind
this note will turn to consider whether the decision in House
of Lords can be described in terms of facilitation or frustra-
tion.
THE HOUSE OF LORDS
Before considering the decision of the House of Lords, a
couple of introductory points must bemade about the system
for receipt of asylum seekers within the European Union.
Pursuant to art 10 of the Dublin II Regulation, the Member
State in which an asylum seeker arrives will be responsible
for processing the individual’s claim for asylum. To manage
this arrangement the EURODAC system of fingerprinting
was introduced to prevent individuals from entering into the
EU through certain soft spots in the walls of fortress Europe
and then moving across borders prior to making an official
application for asylum.
One of the consequences of the arguably successful imple-
mentation of Dublin II and EURODAC has meant that
certain States on the EU rim have received a disproportion-
ately large number of asylum seekers. States that comewithin
this category, such as Greece, have responded by adopting
policies in relation to managing asylum applications that are
then criticised as being contrary to international protection
standards under the 1951 Convention and in accordance
with UNHCR standards (Nasseri judgment).
MrNasseri was an Afghan national who arrived inGreece
and, having lodged an application for asylum, fled to the UK
where a further asylum claim was made. In accordance with
the provisions of Dublin II and the UK Asylum and Immigra-
tion (Treatment of Claimants) Act 2004 that deems Greece a
safe country for the purposes of return, the Secretary of State
ordered that the appellant be sent back to Greece. The
appellant challenged the validity of this decision by citing art
3 of the EuropeanConvention claiming that he faced a risk of
inhuman and degrading treatment if sent back to Greece, due
to the likelihood of being subsequently refouled to Afghani-
stan (Nasseri, para [4]).
An appeal was brought on the grounds that art 3 would be
breached where there was no inquiry into the risk of refoule-
ment, due to the prior designation of Greece as a safe
country. The appellant cited the European Court of Human
Rights when it held that Dublin II did not in fact absolve the
State of its responsibility to ensure that the asylum seeker
would not be exposed to a breach of art 3 on return. On this
basis the appellant argued that the decision of the Secretary
of State could not be upheld (TI v UK [2000] INLR 211).
The House found that in order for the UK to satisfy its
obligations under art 3 it was only required to establish that
the individual’s rights under art 3 would not be infringed if
returned to Greece (para [22]). It dismissed the appeal but
not before making findings as to the potential risks faced by
the appellant in being returned.
As noted above, Greece is one of several EUMembers that
has been criticised for its asylum processing policies that
included dismissing an application of any individual whose
claim was suspended for longer than three months, usually
because they had sought asylum in another country. Con-
cerns were voiced by Member States and human rights
organisations and in 2008Greecewas threatenedwith infrac-
tion proceedings by the European Commission (para [32]).
On this basis, and referring to the guidelines noted above that
relate to implementation of the right to return, it could be
said that the decision of the House to dismiss the appeal was
unsustainable and viewed more as frustrating rather than
facilitating international protection.
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However, both Lord Hoffmann, and in a separate com-
ment, Lord Scott, gave reasons as to why the House consid-
ered that the appellant did not face a real risk of a breach of
art 3 and why return of the individual would facilitate the
objective of burden sharing that characterises the framework
of asylum protection in the EU (para [32]). Following the
threat of infraction proceedings, Greece had amended its
legislation to ensure compliance with the several directives
and regulations binding Member States and relating to asy-
lum protection. In addition, the very Member status of
Greece is conditional on adoption of the Convention. As if
specifically citing the guidelines given above, LordHoffmann
noted that mere adoption of the Convention was insufficient
without effective implementation but considered that in the
absence of any evidence to the contrary the House was
entitled to find that Greece would uphold its obligations
accordingly. Finally, it was noted that Greece had never
previously refouled an individual to Afghanistan (para [34])
and “accordingly there appeared to be no real risk that Mr
Nasseri would be returned to Afghanistan contrary to his
Convention rights under art 3”.
RELEVANCE FOR NEW ZEALAND
The House of Lords considered that the appellant was not at
risk from persecution in being returned to the country of first
arrival in view of the protection of international agreements
to which both the UK and Greece are party, including Dublin
II and the Convention. It is the opinion of the UNHCR that
“such arrangements can work within a multilateral, legal
framework, such as that of the European Union, where clear
reciprocal obligations are imposed on States” (UNHCR“Sub-
missions on theNewZealand ImmigrationBill 2007”para19).
Where there are no such arrangements however, the UNHCR
has expressed strong concerns about whether States should
adopt a policy of return.
Submissions were made by the UNHCR and Amnesty
International following the introduction of the 2007 Immi-
gration Bill in New Zealand. This was because cl 125 per-
mitted the return of asylum seekers to a country of first
arrival on the basis that the individual was entitled to seek
asylum in that country. The UNHCR noted that “most
asylum-seekers come to the region through countries which
are neither signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention and do
not have even the most basic capacity to provide protection
and durable solutions to refugees” (UNHCR para 20). This
could lead to the individual being refouled to face the risk of
persecution and created the potential that New Zealand
could escape its obligations in relation to international pro-
tection on purely procedural grounds.
Two points, however, suggest that the concerns raised by
the UNHCR are not borne out and that the potential that a
right to return will be used to undermine the framework for
international protection appears to be managed, at least in
the context of New Zealand.
First, New Zealand is one of only ten countries that
annually assume a full quota of UNHCR refugees. This
confirms that the State actively seeks to share the burden of
international protection, rather than avoiding its obligations
which would give rise to the suspicion that cl 125 could be
used as a means to escape the State’s responsibilities.
Second, cl 125 of the Immigration Bill was amended in
response to the criticism by the UNHCR so that the question
facing decision-makers was not whether the State had “a
reason to decline to consider a claim” but “whether a claim-
ant had the protection of another country” which meant the
State was not obliged to consider the claim (“Commentary”
Immigration Bill 2007, p 17). Specifically, there would be
“protection” where New Zealand was in an arrangement of
some sort with another State, under which bothwere party to
the Refugee Convention, the Convention Against Torture
and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
and the other State had a satisfactory process for the process-
ing of asylum applications.
Currently New Zealand is not party to any such arrange-
ments resembling those listed under cl 125. However, given
the provision made under cl 125, the model set by the EU
with UNHCR approval and the precedent and guidance
provided by the House of Lords in theNasseri judgment it is
argued here that the right to return can be implemented in
New Zealand in a manner that facilitates rather than frus-
trates the framework for international protection. r
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achieved by the use of “disembodied” execution pages that
potentially leave open the possibility of a signatory later
arguing that the document to which their signature was later
affixed was not the document to which they agreed.
Notwithstanding its cautionary value, it remains to be
seen whether the controversial reasoning in Mercury would
be adopted by a New Zealand court. The statements in
Mercury about execution of documents were obiter and in
light of their inconsistency with a long-standing precedent
from a higher court (which remains the leading English
authority on the subject), it is doubtful that a New Zealand
judge would be persuaded to take a similar approach should
a dispute with similar facts come up in New Zealand.
In addition, s 11 of the Property Law Act 2007 abolished
the historical legal rule that rendered a deed invalid if it is
materially altered after its execution. This legislative provi-
sion sheds further doubt on whether a hard-line approach to
execution of deeds would be taken by a New Zealand court.
Given the recent publicly reported cases involving the
alleged falsification of documents in connection with the
Blue Chip investment scheme, it may be that this issue is
raised before New Zealand courts sooner rather than later.
Cynics would claim that it is possible (however unlikely) that
the approach Underhill J took in Mercury could appear
attractive to a New Zealand judge faced with a sympathetic
plaintiff seeking to recover their retirement savings by invali-
dating adocument altered after executionby someone involved
in the scheme.
What is certain is thatMercury directly impacts the execu-
tion of deeds and other contracts governed by English law.
NewZealand lawyers arranging for the execution of English-
law governed documents in NewZealand will need to ensure
that they have taken the appropriate measures with respect
to execution. In addition, New Zealand firms which engage
UK-based local counsel should keep the case in mind in
determining how completion should occur, particularly if an
unqualified legal opinion as to due execution is required
from the English firm. r
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